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of creditors as long as recovery can be had from that party. If the trustee
is unable to collect against the transferee, there is a stronger argument that
the creditor should be held; however, if the transferee is available and
solvent, the present court's imposition of liability upon the creditor seems
to be opposed to the policy expressed in Dean. This is probably what the
court was considering when it gratuitously suggested that the creditor
might still be able to collect back against the transferee on his indorsement. 12 However, carrying such a suggestion into effect raises several
serious collateral problems. If the note which the third-party indorsed has
been cancelled, as presumably it had been when payment was made, it is
difficult to see how any action could be maintained. Indeed, nonproduction
of the instrument would appear to render the entire claim valueless under
the Statute of Frauds. s Further, it is possible that the recorded satisfaction
of the judgment already rendered against the third-party on his indorsement would preclude another proceeding for the same relief. In any
event, a much easier and more economic solution can be obtained merely
by ordering the transferee to retransfer the shares to the trustee and by
allowing the creditor to keep the payment of the note. Such a result could
even be said to benefit the estate and the other creditors since the paid
creditor's claim would have been satisfied.
Thomas A. Hogan

CIVIL PROCEDURE--NoNRSIDtNT MOTORIST STATUTZS-EXTPNT TO
wiCnH JURISDICTION MAY BZ AcQui~m.
Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. (4th Cir. 1961).
A resident of Texas purchased an automobile for her son to use
while stationed in North Carolina on military duty. The defendant insurance company issued a liability insurance policy on the car which
,future creditors: (a) if made or incurred in contemplation of the filing of a petition

initiating a proceeding under this title by or against the debtor or in contemplation of liquidation of all or the greater portion of the debtor's property, with intent to
use the consideration obtained for such transfer or obligation to enable any creditor
of such debtor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class, and (b) if the transferee or obligee of such transfer or obligation,

knew or believed that the debtor intended 'to make such use of such consideration.
The remedies of the trustee for the avoidance of such transfer or obligation and of
any ensuing preference shall be cumulative: Provided, however, That the trustee shall

be entitled to only one satisfaction with respect thereto."

12. Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41, 52 n.13 (1961).
13. There seems to be no possibility of restitution here for it can hardly be
said that Lemley was unjustly enriched since everyone was returned to the same position

as before the questioned transaction.
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covered anyone driving with the permission of the named insured owner.
The owner told her son "to be careful how he drove and who he let
drive".' The son subsequently loaned the car to a fellow serviceman
who negligently struck and killed plaintiff's intestate. Plaintiff administratrix sued both the driver and the owner in a North Carolina court,
substituted service being had on the owner in accordance with the state's
nonresident motorist statute.2 Judgment was entered against both defendants in that suit, although the defendant owner elected not to defend.
The plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court against
the insurance company on its policy. Defendant insurance company claimed
that the state court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant owner
in the first action because the North Carolina statute did not reach
her, or, if it did so, that it denied her due process of law. Judgment
was entered against the defendant in the district court, and she appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
holding that the statute authorized service against the nonresident owner
and afforded her due process of law. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity
Co., 294 F. 2d 641 (4th Cir. 1961).3
The nonresident motorist, or "longarm", statute first appeared in 1908
in New Jersey. 4 That rather primitive legislative attempt required under
penalty of prosecution that any nonresident motorist using New Jersey's
roads expressly designate the secretary of state as his agent for service
of process in any suit arising from an accident on the highway. The
statute was upheld by the United States Supreme Court against arguments that it was in violation of due process and an interference with
interstate commerce. 5 The classic case in this field, however, is Hess
v. Pawloski,6 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts statute
under which any nonresident motorist was deemed, by his use of the
state's roads, to have appointed a state official his agent for service of
process'T. The rationale of Hess was that motor vehicles are inherently
1. Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 643 (1961).
2. N.C. GtN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1959):
§ 1-105. Service upon nonresident drivers of motor vehicles and upon the
personal representatives of deceased nonresident drivers of motor vehicles. - The

acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by the laws
now or hereafter in force in this State permitting the operation of motor
vehicles, as evidenced by the operation of a motor vehicle by such nonresident
on the public highways of this State . . . shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles . . . to
be his true and lawful attorney . . . upon whom may be served all summonses or
other lawful process in any action or proceeding . . . growing out of any
accident or collision in which said nonresident may be involved by reason of
the operation by him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or
implied, of a motor vehicle on such public highways of this State ....
3. There were two other questions on appeal: (1) whether the nonresident
defendant was the owner of the automobile; and (2) whether she had consented to
the driver's use of the car. These questions were answered by the court in the
affirmative. 249 F.2d 641, 649 (1961).
4. N.J. Auto Law of 1908 (N.J. LAws, 1908, p. 613).
5. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30 (1908).
6. 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927).
7. Id.
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dangerous machines, the use of which the state can regulate in the public
interest, and that, by use of the state's highways, the driver had impliedly
consented to substituted service. It was recognized in a later Supreme
Court case that the theory of "consent" employed in Hess is a fiction.8 Hess,
however, remains the only case involving the precise question of what
jurisdictional nexus is necessary to satisfy due process in the area of
nonresident motorist statutes to be heard by the Supreme Court. A New
Jersey statute was questioned subsequently as to the notice required by due
process, but Hess was cited as controlling the jurisdictional question.9
It thus clearly states the accepted doctrine on this constitutional aspect. 10
Since its decision, however, there has been a considerable development
concerning the constitutionally permissible means of acquiring jurisdiction
over foreign business entities, and these cases, as will be seen, bear on the
rationale of Hess indirectly in that they have developed the theory of
'"minimum contacts" between the forum and the defendant necessary
for
a jurisdictional nexus satisfactory to the due process clause."
At the present time, every state except Alaska, and the District
of Columbia as well, has a nonresident motorist statute.' 2 Originally,
these statutes dealt exclusively with owners who were operating their
vehicle at the time of the accident.'2 Now, however, they are usually
written or interpreted as subjecting the owner to substituted service if
the driver involved in the accident was driving with his permission either
expressed 4 or implied, 15 and thus do not require the physical presence
of the owner in the state. There is authority to the effect that the owner
must in some way consent to the driver's use of the car in order for substituted service to be in accord with due process.' 6 It is, of course, for
the state to decide whether a particular driver fits within its nonresident
motorist statute. Thus, the court in the instant case based its decision
as to statutory interpretation on two North Carolina cases, in both of
which permission of some kind was found to be necessary under the
8. Olberling v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83 (1953).
9. Wuchter v. Rizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928).
10. See Olberling v. Ill. Cent. R.R., supra note 8; Wuchter v. Rizzutti,
supra note 9.
11. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct.
(1957); Olberling v. Ill. Cent. R.R., supra note 8; Travelers Health Ass'n 199v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 70 S. Ct. 927 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.

Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553 (1935).

U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958).

12. See Note, Nonresident Motorist Statutes

But see Hanson v. Denckla, 357

-

Their Current Scope, 44 IOWA

L. Rev. 384 (1959), where the statutes are collected.
13. See the Massachusetts statute in Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 6.
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.55 (Supp. 1957); Nen. Rev. STAT. §
(Supp. 1956); UTAH CODs ANN. § 41-12-8 (1953); Wyo. ComP. STAT.
§ 60-1101 (Supp. 1955).
15. ALA. COD tit. 7, § 199 (1940) ; D9L. CODS ANN. tit. 10, § 3112 (Supp.
N.Y. VtHIcLt & TRAFFIC LAW § 52 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1201
1957) ; TEsNN. CoDn ANN. § 20-224 (Supp. 1958).

25-530
ANN.

1957);
(Supp.

16. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
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statute.1 In one case, the permission was based upon the "family purpose" doctrine,18 and, in the other, it was found under a statute which
authorizes a presumption of control of the driver by the owner.' 9 North
Carolina would thus seem to be in accord with other jurisdictions in requiring permission of some sort running from owner to driver in order
to subject the owner to substituted service.
Generally, the use of "longarm" statutes as a basis of personal jurisdiction is subject to two due process requirements.2 0 First, the statute
must afford the nonresident adequate notice of the institution of suit
against him. This requirement has been fairly standardized today by a
statutory provision for notice by registered letter to the nonresident ill
addition to substituted service on a state official. 2 ' The second, and more
nebulous, requirement is a nexus or connection between the nonresident
and the state attempting to acquire jurisdiction sufficient to justify such
assertion of jurisdiction. Although cases dealing with jurisdiction over
corporations not domiciled within a state and cases concerning jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists are factually distinguishable, in some ways
they present similar problems; consequently, the discussion of the nexus
problem in International Shoe Co. v. Washington22 is not without bearing on this problem. There the Court said, in discussing the nexus
problem:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" ..... Whether due process
is satisfied depends rather upon the quality and nature of the activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.2 3 (Emphasis
added).
Prior to InternationalShoe, an important point in establishing nexus was
the number of contacts with the state, 24 but International Shoe emphasized
the "quality and nature" of the contacts as a basis for obtaining jurisdiction if "fairness" warranted it, so that a single contact with the state
under proper circumstances would be a sufficient connection to satisfy
2 5
due process and confer jurisdiction.
17. Howard v. Sasso, 253 N.C. 185, 116 S.E.2d 341 (1960); Ewing v. Thompson,

233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951).

18. Ewing v. Thompson, supra note 17.

19. Howard v. Sasso, supra note 17.

20. Hess v. Pawloski, supra note 6; Wuchter v. Rizzutti supra note 9.
21. See note 2 supra.
22. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
23. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319, 66 S. Ct.
154, 158, 160 (1945).
24. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245 (1913).
25. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199
(1957), the assertion of jurisdiction by California over a Texas company was upheld
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Prior to International Shoe, the Massachusetts' "longarm" statute
applied in Hess was interpreted to mean that the nonresident motorist
"consented" to be sued. The fiction of "consent" was used as a convenient solution to a growing national problem. The automobile, everincreasing in speed, size and number, was involving residents of different
states in serious accidents.26 Each state saw the need for protection of
its citizens from the "unsuable" nonresident by affording a convenient
forum for redress. The inadequacy of the "consent" rationalization as a
basis for the solution of this problem, however, is obvious. That it is
absurd to say that one "consents" to being sued in a foreign jurisdiction
was pointed up by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Olberling v. Ill. Cent. R.R.2 7
"But to conclude . . . that the motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is altogether immaterial, has actually agreed to
be sued ...is surely to move in the world of Alice in Wonderland. ' 28
As to the policy upon which he really believed these statutes rested
Justice Frankfurter continued, "[T]he potentialities of damage by a
motorist in a population as mobile as ours, are such that those whom
he injures must have opportunity of redress against him, provided only
that he has an opportunity to defend himself." 29 Justice Frankfurter's
opinion disposes of the fiction of "consent" as a basis for these statutes
and places emphasis on their "reasonableness."
A more realistic and workable justification than the fiction of consent
would be one placing emphasis on legal control of the automobile from an
ownership standpoint. While it is unreasonable to expect an owner to
consent to suit, it is eminently reasonable to expect him to control his
automobile, both while driving it himself, and permitting others to drive
it. Both the "family purpose doctrine, 30° and the presumption that one
31
proven to be an agent was driving within the scope of his authority,
are based on the theory that one who owns an automobile and who knows
the potentially serious consequences of its use, should be responsible for
the activity of those whom he authorizes to drive. As the instant case
acknowledges, "[I]t is not pushing the matter too far to recognize that
the state may also assert the jurisdiction of its courts over the owner who
placed the vehicle in the driver's hands to take it onto the state's highwhere the only act by the company was mailing a policy to, and receiving payments
from, the insured, who resided in California.
26. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Traffic Safety Report, in regard to the total
number of annual motor vehicle accidents in that state, shows (1) 1958 - 156,825;
(2) 1959 - 157,191; (3) 1960 - 159,051. Statistics on the percentage of nonresident motorists involved are not available. Whatever the percentage may be,
however, it is safe to assume that it is inceeasing in proportion to the total accident
rate.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See note 8 supra.
Olberling v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341, 74 S. Ct. 83, 85 (1953).
Ibid.
Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951).
Howard v. Sasso, 253 N.C. 185, 116 S.E.2d 341 (1960).
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ways." 3 2- To illustrate the extent to which this control doctrine could be
used to acquire jurisdiction, we may consider the following five situations.
The first situation is that of Hess where the defendant is both
owner and driver; since the owner is physically controlling his vehicle
the control theory would obviously cover this type of situation.
In the second situation, the owner, a resident of state X, gives unlimited
permission to the driver to use his automobile anywhere; the driver injures
plaintiff in state Y. This is essentially the instant case. The North Carolina
statute states that service of process on the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles is to be as binding as personal service on the nonresident, for
any suit "growing out of any accident . . . in which said nonresident may
be involved by reason of the operation by him, for him, or under his control or direction, express or implied . . ." involving a motor vehicle. 3
(Emphasis added.) Permission, running from the nonresident owner to her
son, to allow others to drive was established as a matter of fact at trial,
so the court properly concluded that the automobile was being impliedly
orperated under the "control" of the nonresident owner. "The words .'express or implied' suggest only a minimal connection between the driver
and the owner which is satisfied if the owner has a legal right to control
the operation of the automobile." 3 4 (Emphasis added.) Thus the court
is properly subjecting the nonresident registered owner to jurisdiction for
accidents involving anyone using the automobile with the owner's permission.
In the third situation, the owner, a resident of X, gives limited permission to the driver, also a resident of X, to use his automobile only in X;
the driver injures the plaintiff in Y. Judge Learned Hand, in Sheer v.
Rockne Motors Corp.,3 5 concluded that the owner could not be reached
on these facts. That case, however, was decided in 1934, and since then, as
has been noted, jurisdictional standards have been broadened consisderably.
Moreover, the problems in this area, and hence the state's interest in securing jurisdiction, have increased considerably. The Sheer holding would
seem therefore, to be of questionable vitality under present conditions
and also to be inconsistent with a "control" as opposed to a "consent"
theory. Even though the driver had no express permission to operate
the automobile in the state where the accident occurred, to be consistent,
jurisdiction should be imposed on the nonresident -owner since he placed
the automobile in the hands of the driver and had a "legal right to control"
at the time of the accident. Policy reasons support jurisdiction on these
facts, since the unique instrumentality of the automobile is involved and
since the owner allowed the negligent individual to use the car.
The fourth situation involves theft of the automobile through the fault
of the owner; for example, the owner left the key in the ignition and there
3Z
33.
34.
35.

Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 648 (4th Cir. 1961).
See note 2 supra.
Davis v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 294 F.2d 641, 645 (4th Cir. 1961).
68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
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